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Food, Financial Crises, and Complex Derivatives: A Tale of High 
Stakes Innovation and Diversification 
Vera Songwe
In the summer of 2008, food prices, which had been rising 
steeply over the last year, reached historic highs. The prices of 
wheat and rice doubled; corn prices more than tripled. The rap-
id rise in food prices in 2007–8 led to social unrest and/or civil 
conflict in over 40 countries. Meanwhile, during 2008–9, the 
number of hungry people increased globally, from around 896 
million to over 1.023 billion; in 2010, it dropped to 925 million 
(FAO and WFP 2009). 1 As a result of these developments, at-
tainment of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), espe-
cially MDG1, to halve poverty by 2015, which was in sight for a 
number of low-income countries (LICs) in Africa in early 2007, 
has been severely compromised (World Bank 2010). According 
to the recent World Bank Food Price Watch (October 2011), glob-
al food prices remain high and volatile three years after the food 
price crisis. The persistent fragility of the global economy re-
quires more vigilance on this front, and also a better understand-
ing of the links between the food and financial crisis. 
A large body of literature exists on the causes and impacts of 
the 2008 food crisis (von Braun 2008; World Bank 2008a; 
Timmer 2009; FAO and WFP 2009; Prakash 2011). However, 
it is rarely acknowledged that in 2007, “No Street”2—even be-
fore “Main Street”—was already feeling the pain of the impend-
ing financial crisis: the food crisis was foreshadowing the finan-
cial crisis. For nearly a decade, the developing countries had 
benefited from favorable monetary and regulatory policies in 
the West. In 2008, developing countries shared the downside 
risk of these policies, and therefore should be part of the discus-
sion on resolving the problem. 
The 2008 food price crisis was an integral part of the financial crisis. In fact, the food price crisis was the second crisis in a 
chain of events that began in 2007 with the mortgage crisis, and culminated in the worst financial crisis since the Great 
Depression. Contrary to what was generally believed in 2008, developing countries, particularly food-importing countries, 
were part of the early wave of the financial crisis via food price increases, and later suffered another wave via the real sector. 
The events leading up to the food crisis were global and complex in nature. As a result, as the G-20 discusses solutions to the 
financial crisis, any new framework must include developing countries, especially low-income countries. In addition, 
developing countries, especially in Africa, must pay close attention to the work of the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and 
its recommendations on financial market reform, and over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives in particular, because these 
reforms will have important consequences for their housing, food, fuel, financial markets, and ultimately their growth and 
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This note has three objectives: first, to establish the connec-
tions between the food price crisis and the financial crisis; sec-
ond, highlight the beneficial impacts financial market global-
ization, financial innovation, and diversification had on many 
developing countries; and third, propose that infrastructure to 
support globalization of financial markets needs to be designed 
to respond to the needs and specificities of developing as well as 
developed countries. A lack of understanding of the intimate 
link between the events precipitating the financial crisis and 
the food crisis will undermine policy proposals intended to 
help LICs address this new reality.
This note recommends that all solutions to issues of com-
modity price volatility must be part of a comprehensive finan-
cial market regulation package and, in particular, must include 
the regulation of commodity markets, financial products, and 
institutions linked to trade in agriculture commodities. Africa 
and other LICs need functioning and innovative financial mar-
kets to manage volatility and to support more inclusive growth. 
Regulation should facilitate and not undermine this objective. 
Rapid Globalization, Deepening Market 
Links, and Unprecedented Growth:  
2000–2007  
Interest rates, the housing market, and growth. The sequence of 
events leading up to the food price crisis of 2007–8 began with 
the Federal Reserve Bank’s easing of monetary policy in 2001. 
This was followed by rapid financial innovation, taking place in 
an already favorable regulatory environment in the United 
States, which was in place from the mid-1990s through 2008. 
Following the recession of 2001, the Federal Reserve Bank ex-
panded the money supply in a bid to stimulate demand and 
restore growth. As a result, the Federal Funds Rate—the interest 
rate at which depository institutions lend balances to each oth-
er overnight—was lowered from 6.25 percent in January 2001 
to 1.75 percent by the end 2001: this was one of the most ag-
gressive interest rate reductions ever taken by 
the Federal Reserve (Piger 2002). By mid-
2003, nominal rates were lower than the rate 
of inflation. As a strategy for reviving growth in 
the United States, this monetary policy stance 
was highly successful. By the end of 2004, the 
growth rate of the U.S. economy had more 
than tripled.3 This growth was largely fueled by 
growth in the housing sector. 
The second-related event was the change in 
mortgage policies in the housing industry. The 
lowering of short-term interest rates not only 
fueled growth in the dollar volume of mortgage 
lending, but also changed buyers’ preferences 
for mortgage types. With short-term rates low-
er than the traditional 30-year rates, buyers 
opted increasingly for adjustable rate mortgag-
es (ARMs),4 assuming that rates would stay low for a long time. 
This increase in risk taking by consumers was matched by an 
increase in the complexity of the innovative financial sector 
products offered and purchased by investment firms, among 
themselves and to and by other institutions. With the increase 
in the volume of ARMs, banks needed to spread and diversify 
their risk. A new instrument—the mortgage-backed security 
(MBS)—became very popular. After a mortgage was sold, it was 
bundled with other subprime mortgages and immediately re-
sold as part of a complex portfolio of MBSs, often involving 
OTC5 financial derivative contracts (as opposed to exchange-
traded derivatives).6 In the early to mid-2000s, growing quanti-
ties of MBSs were sold to financial institutions the world over. 
Firms used MBSs to diversify their portfolio while carrying 
highly rated debt instruments that were insured by other de-
rivative instruments known as credit default swaps (CDSs).   
MBSs and CDSs were again bundled into another asset class 
called collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) and sold to other 
financial investment firms, essentially globalizing the risks of 
U.S. homeowners. These new risk-management instruments 
allowed banks to accelerate lending to housing sector. 
From 2000 to 2006, the number of subprime mortgages 
grew threefold (Shiller 2008), as new innovative instruments 
for managing risk developed. By 2006, subprime or near-prime 
mortgages had grown to 34 percent (US$1 trillion) of all mort-
gages, from 12 percent of all mortgages in 2000. In fact in 2006, 
one-quarter of all mortgages were conventional nonprime loans 
(GAO 2009), with an associated increase in risk. About 45 per-
cent of subprime borrowers in 2001 had less than 20 percent 
equity in their houses at the time of purchase; by 2006, this pro-
portion had increased to an unprecedented 60 percent (Walli-
son 2008). As the demand for houses grew, so did the price of 
houses. Between January 2002 and June 2006, housing prices 
increased by 87 percent.7 The increase in housing prices raised 
























Figure 1. Growth in the United States, Sub-Saharan Africa, the Euro Area, and BRIC 
Countries 2001–10
Source: World Bank Development Indicators.
Note: BRIC = Brazil, the Russian Federation, India, and China.3  POVERTY REDUCTION AND ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT (PREM) NETWORK     www.worldbank.org/economicpremise
mand helped push demand up in the United States, igniting a 
period of strong export-led growth in China. By 2006, global 
gross domestic product (GDP) had expanded by 4 percent as 
Europe, Asia, and Africa all grew on the back of this favorable 
economic push fueled by the United States and China.  
Unprecedented growth in Africa and the world. From 2001–
7, Africa experienced unprecedented economic growth, with 
GDP increasing from US$307 billion to US$817 billion, in 
current dollar terms.8 By 2005, Africa was experiencing the 
first five-year period since 1960 in which per capita growth for 
Africa remained positive in every year. The poverty rate went 
from 59 percent in 1995 to 50 percent in 2005 (Sala-i-Martin 
and Pinkovskiy 2010). 
In the early 2000s, many African countries focused on get-
ting the fundamentals of economic management right. They 
worked to reduce their debt, control inflation, and establish 
sustainable fiscal policies. Foreign exchange reserves, including 
gold, increased more than 300 percent, from US$37 billion in 
2001 to US$154 billion in 2008. In addition, African coun-
tries also began to address some of the fundamental structural 
rigidities in their economies; policies to crowd in the private 
sector were increasingly being adopted and the opening up of 
hitherto publicly dominated sectors, such as telecommunica-
tions, and the reduction of public sector borrowing from the 
banking sector helped support growth. 
These reforms, coupled with an overall favorable external 
economic environment, produced quick results. Net foreign 
direct investment (FDI) flows more than doubled, and, for the 
first time, FDI flows into Africa exceeded overseas develop-
ment assistance (World Bank 2008b). Much of this growth was 
driven by increased commodity exports to developed countries 
and to newly emerging economies such as Brazil, the Russian 
Federation, India, and China (the BRIC countries). Nigeria, for 
example, bolstered by robust oil revenues, nearly doubled its 
share in world markets from 0.27 percent to 0.50 percent. 
South Africa, improved its export share from 0.46 percent to 
0.63 percent. This pattern of export growth from emerging to 
developed countries and from developing to emerging coun-
tries created a “virtuous circle” of global economic growth. 
However, this rapid increase in world growth drove up 
nonoil commodity prices, which rose by about 30 percent, 
while oil prices shot up over 40 percent.9 Then, the U.S. econo-
my began to overheat. 
The Crisis: Interest Rates, Biofuels, and 
Commodities
By early 2006 in the United States, core inflation reached an 
average rate of 3.2 percent. The United States responded to the 
threat of high oil prices and high inflation by raising interest 
rates and passing a biofuels law to encourage increased diversi-
fication in energy sources. The Federal Funds and one-year 
Treasury Bill interest rates peaked at 5.3 percent in June 2006.10 
With the rise in interest rates, the housing market witnessed a 
sharp contraction, demand for ARMs dried up, and the rate of 
increase in housing prices leveled off (Office of Federal Hous-
ing Enterprise Oversight 2010). By the third quarter of 2006, 
the growth of U.S. residential investment swung from 0.5 per-
cent in 2005 to negative -1.1 percent. This decline, in addition 
to a drop in household consumption, ushered in a slowdown in 
U.S. growth. U.S. GDP in the third quarter of 2006 dropped 
for the first time in five years (figure 1).11
The impacts on the residential MBS (RMBS) market are 
shown in figure 2. The ABX.HE indices are equally weighted 
indices of the 20 largest volume subprime RBMSs. The ABX 
indices are based on credit derivatives written on MBSs that are 
backed by subprime mortgage loans. They help investors track 
the price of credit default insurance on a basket of subprime 
mortgage deals. The ABX index family served as a barometer of 
the stability of the subprime mortgage market when it was 
launched in 2005, and later, in 2007, it helped track the col-
lapsing valuations in the U.S. subprime mortgage market. By 
early 2008, America’s leading banks had all absorbed substan-
tial losses from the mortgage market. Citigroup absorbed a 
US$60 billion default, while Merrill Lynch announced a 
US$50 billion write off.12 The Bank of International Settle-
ments (BIS) estimates that in 2008, the value of MBSs in the 
system was over US$2 trillion.
By early 2007, Wall Street began to feel the first tremors 
from the derivatives markets. Defaults were rising in the mort-
gage market. The market for CDOs’ underlying assets also be-
gan to disappear and investors tried to divest and diversify into 
other asset classes. A similar situation is underway today with 
sovereign debt. One asset class continued to yield positive re-
turns: commodities.
Diversification into commodity markets
Relative to consumer prices in developing countries, interna-
tionally traded agriculture commodity prices were broadly sta-
ble until 2007, when prices of internationally traded food com-
modities (maize, wheat, and soybeans) rose very rapidly (World 
Bank 2008b). On the other hand, global agricultural futures 
markets experienced rapid growth starting in late 2004. The 
open interest for many agricultural futures markets doubled or 
even tripled from late 2004 through 2006. For example, the 
Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) wheat futures market saw 
open interest increase 275 percent from June 2004 to June 
2006.13 There are many reasons for this growth in commodity 
futures markets, including improved trading infrastructure on 
futures markets—electronic trading made it easier for noncom-
mercial and index funds to interact in these markets; better and 
faster access to information; an inflationary environment for 
many commodity markets also made it an attractive market for 
traders and increased the demand for commodities; and rising 
costs of production for many commodities, as inputs costs rose, 
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tions diversified out of derivatives with U.S. mortgage 
instruments into commodity derivatives. 
Commodity index funds trade on a basket of up to 20 or 
more commodities, primarily oil and metals (ores), but also ag-
ricultural commodities. While agricultural commodities usu-
ally account for 10–20 percent of the index, between 2003 
and 2008, the volume of index fund trade increased by 1,900 
percent, from US$13 billion to US$260 billion (CFTC 2008). 
These amounts can be traded by index funds because index 
fund trades are not linked to real promissory notes to purchase 
a commodity from anyone. 
More diversification from oil to grain 
In response to continued increases in oil prices 
and a faltering U.S. economy, the U.S. Congress 
passed two pieces of legislation: the Energy Policy 
Act of 2005 and the Energy Independence and 
Security Act (EISA) of 2007. Initially, the Energy 
Policy Act called for 5.4 billion gallons of biofuels 
to be blended with gasoline by 2008, increasing 
to 7.5 billion gallons in 2012. In addition, the 
EISA mandated 36 billion gallons of biofuels be 
blended by 2022. These two bills created incen-
tives for U.S. producers to sharply increase etha-
nol production over the next two decades. The 
immediate consequence of the Energy Policy Act 
was that once oil prices rose above about US$75 
per barrel, it became profitable with subsidies to 
Another reason for the increase in commodity prices in 
2007 is directly related to the crisis in the housing market. As 
the credit crisis hit, more institutional investors further diversi-
fied into the commodity futures market. Trade in agricultural 
commodities and futures increased by 32 percent in the first 
two quarters of 2007 (BIS 2010b), and the value of OTC com-
modity derivatives in that period increased by over 150 per-
cent.14 Index funds and other noncommercial financial institu-


















































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3. Notional Outstanding OTC Commodity Derivatives 2002–10
Source: http://www.bis.org/statistics/derstats.htm.5  POVERTY REDUCTION AND ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT (PREM) NETWORK     www.worldbank.org/economicpremise
switch to corn-based ethanol (Mitchell 2008). As a result, 
ethanol production increased by an average of almost 22 per-
cent per year through 2007. The number of ethanol plants 
more than doubled. 
This diversification away from oil and into corn-based etha-
nol was one of the causes of the food price crisis. Increased de-
mand for biofuels has been estimated to account for as much 
as 70 percent of the increase in corn prices and 40 percent of 
the increase in soybean prices during 2007–8 (IMF 2009a). 
These policies also helped turn corn and other grains into an 
asset class. Corn trading by index traders increased as the pro-
duction of ethanol and the demand for corn increased. For ex-
ample, the net notional values associated with corn commodi-
ty index trading increased by over 30 percent from March 
2007 to June 2008.
The trend in ethanol plant expansion leveled off in early 
2009 because of declining ethanol profitability, and because 
the expansion of U.S. ethanol production was approaching the 
U.S. government’s renewable fuels standard mandate of 15 bil-
lion gallons for the year 2015. However, with oil prices increas-
ing again, the trend has been reversed. According to data from 
the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), in 2009, 
10.75 billion gallons of ethanol were produced. Production 
rose to a record of 13.23 billion gallons in 2010.
Africa’s Food Market and the Crisis
Trends in agriculture exports and imports, 2000–2008. For 
close to a decade, Africa—No Street and its farmers—benefited 
from the low interest rates, a favorable exchange rate, with the 
United States in particular, and a favorable financial regulatory 
policy environment; this led to an increase in exports and 
growth in incomes. 
During this period, Africa’s economic structure changed. 
In 2001, agriculture represented over 22 percent of total GDP 
in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA); this dropped to an average of 16 
percent by 2008 as other sectors grew, especially the mining 
and service sectors, as well as finance. Another reason for the 
drop in agriculture as a share of GDP was the drop in agricul-
ture production and productivity in Africa, which began de-
clining in the early 1980s and continued through the 2000s in 
many African countries (World Bank 2008c). World food 
stocks were also high during this period, and helped keep agri-
culture prices low. 
Despite the drop in contribution to GDP, a significant num-
ber of people, over 70 percent of the rural population in SSA, 
depends on agriculture for their livelihood. This figure masks 
the wide heterogeneity of the region. In 2001, agriculture as a 
share of GDP was over 50 percent in Liberia, Nigeria, the Dem-
ocratic Republic of the Congo, Guinea–Bissau and the Central 
African Republic, and over 25 percent of GDP in another 25 
countries on the continent.15 Whereas, agriculture contributed 
to less than 5 percent of GDP since the early 2000s in other 
countries such as Mauritius, the Republic of Congo, South Af-
rica, the Seychelles, and Botswana.  
With the drop in agriculture production, many countries in 
SSA increased their food imports (table 1). Between 2001 and 
2008, raw food imports (defined as imports of meat and dairy 
products, grains, and cereals such as wheat, rice, barley, maize/
corn and other cereals, vegetables, fruits, and dried fruits) in 
SSA grew substantially. In 2001, only five SSA countries im-
ported 3 percent or more of GDP of raw foods. By 2008, the 
number rose to 12 countries, and the share of raw food imports 
as a percentage of GDP increased by over 100 percent in 14 
countries.16 
The food price increase came at a time when world stocks 
had fallen to their lowest levels since the 1980s. Despite the fact 
that the total stocks of commodities such as grains was very low 
and demand by commercial buyers was high, index traders 
such as hedge funds could continue to invest in this market via 
the derivative market, pushing prices even higher. Food stocks 
dropped from 700 million tons in 2000 to less 500 million 
tons in 2008, the lowest levels in many decades.
The impact of food price increases varied by country and by 
commodity. From 2006–8, the price increases in African mar-
kets were highest for maize (87 percent), followed by wheat (65 
percent) and rice (62 percent), while commodities that are less 
widely traded in international markets saw smaller price in-
creases in African markets (Minot 2010). As a result, the food 
price crisis had an immediate impact on the balance of pay-
ments of many African countries such as Tanzania, Benin, 
Guinea, Burundi, and Liberia. In Tanzania, the current ac-
count deficit increased from 4.5 percent of GDP in 2001 to 
11.9 percent in 2008; in Benin, it increased from a 3.8 percent 
of GDP deficit in 2001 to an 8.8 percent deficit in 2008.17 
In many SSA countries, governments responded to the crisis 
by providing general subsidies or tax reductions rather than tar-
geted safety nets. In 2006, when food prices began to rise, many 
of these countries had some built-up reserves and could re-
spond to the price increases. Between 2006 and 2008, nearly 
57 percent of countries reduced taxes on food, while 27 per-
cent reduced taxes on fuels. On the expenditure side, 18 per-
cent of SSA countries increased food subsidies, while 22 per-
cent increased fuel subsidies (IMF 2008a). In Liberia, Senegal, 
Benin and Gabon, governments reduced taxes on fuel prod-
ucts, while Senegal, Mauritius, Swaziland, and Ethiopia in-
creased food subsidies. According to IMF (2009b), the median 
fiscal impact of policy responses to rising food prices was 
around 0.9 percent of country GDP in 2008. By the end of 
2008, a number of these countries could no longer subsidize 
staple food consumption without external balance of payments 
support. By early 2009, many SSA countries were struggling to 
cope with a spiraling food price crisis as civil unrest broke out.
In face of this unrest, some countries imposed export bans, 
traders hoarded what grain was left, and elevator providers 6  POVERTY REDUCTION AND ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT (PREM) NETWORK     www.worldbank.org/economicpremise
           Food imports as % GDP            Agriculture imports as % GDP  Current account balance as % GDP
SSA country 2000/01 2006/7 2007/8 2000/01 2006/7 2007/8 2000/01 2006/7 2007/8
Angola 1.5 0.9 1.0 2.1 1.0 1.1 -3.7 20.8 13.2
Benin 4.4 6.8 9.2 5.6 8.3 10.8 -3.4 -7.1 -8.8
Botswana 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 9.8 15.9 9.0
Burkina Faso 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.7 0.9 0.9 -11.3 -12.7 -18.5
Burundi 0.6 1.6 1.4 1.2 2.3 2.4 -6.4 -12.8 -16.6
Cameroon 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.4 -3.2 1.3 -0.3
Cape Verde 2.1 2.6 3.4 3.0 3.3 4.1 -10.5 -11.2 -14.2
Central African Republic 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.3 .. .. ..
Chad 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 .. .. ..
Comoros 3.9 6.2 6.3 4.6 6.8 6.8 .. .. ..
Congo, Dem. Rep. of 1.2 1.8 1.8 2.0 2.7 2.7 .. .. ..
Congo, Rep. of 1.6 1.6 1.9 2.5 2.3 2.6 9.6 -12.3 -26.1
Côte d’Ivoire 2.6 3.1 3.2 3.6 3.6 3.7 -1.5 1.1 0.6
Equatorial Guinea 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.7 0.5 0.4 .. .. ..
Eritrea 3.7 1.7 1.6 4.6 2.5 2.2 -16.5 .. ..
Ethiopia 1.1 0.4 0.9 1.2 0.6 1.1 -2.2 -8.1 -5.7
Gabon 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.3 1.3 15.4 22.9 ..
Gambia, The 2.4 5.9 7.4 4.7 8.8 10.0 .. -9.0 -5.1
Ghana 2.0 2.1 2.7 2.9 3.1 3.9 -7.0 -6.9 -10.6
Guinea 0.7 2.5 3.1 1.0 3.1 3.9 -3.3 -9.1 -20.5
Guinea-Bissau 1.3 3.5 4.7 1.8 3.9 5.0 -5.6 -5.6 -3.9
Kenya 0.9 1.0 1.2 2.4 2.2 2.7 -2.1 -3.1 -5.2
Lesotho 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.7 0.5 -17.1 9.3 13.3
Liberia 4.1 9.6 9.8 6.0 11.1 13.1 .. -29.3 -36.3
Madagascar 0.5 1.1 1.2 0.9 1.5 1.5 -4.9 .. ..
Malawi 0.8 0.9 0.8 2.3 2.3 2.4 -3.9 .. ..
Mali 0.4 0.7 0.6 1.2 1.1 1.0 -11.2 -5.9 -10.2
Mauritania 2.6 4.5 6.0 3.9 5.8 7.4 .. .. ..
Mauritius 1.6 2.1 2.0 2.3 3.0 3.0 2.7 -7.6 -8.2
Mozambique 1.5 3.4 3.1 3.1 4.9 4.4 -17.1 -10.4 -10.9
Namibia 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 2.6 11.1 5.5
Niger 0.4 0.3 0.3 1.2 1.2 1.1 -5.3 -8.5 -10.3
Nigeria 1.2 0.6 0.7 1.4 0.8 1.0 10.7 20.9 15.3
Rwanda 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.9 0.9 1.0 -5.8 -5.4 -5.0
São Tomé and Principe 2.0 1.5 1.7 2.7 2.6 2.5 -35.3 -45.4 -49.2
Senegal 4.0 4.3 5.3 6.4 5.4 6.6 -6.1 -10.4 -13.0
Seychelles 1.6 2.2 2.7 2.7 4.1 4.1 -15.8 -19.8 -34.9
Sierra Leone 2.5 2.5 3.5 3.5 3.3 4.3 -14.9 -8.2 -10.6
South Africa 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.9 1.0 1.0 0.1 -6.3 -7.3
Sudan 0.6 0.7 0.8 1.0 1.1 1.2 -4.1 -10.1 -4.7
Swaziland 0.2 0.1 0.1 6.9 3.2 1.0 -1.2 -4.8 -5.2
Tanzania 0.4 1.1 0.9 1.0 1.5 1.4 -4.5 -9.3 -11.9
Togo 2.5 4.5 5.1 6.2 6.7 8.2 -11.6 -8.3 -8.2
Uganda 0.1 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.9 0.8 -5.9 -4.0 -4.8
Zambia 0.6 0.3 0.6 1.1 0.5 0.8 -18.3 -2.4 -6.6
Zimbabwe 0.1 4.2 7.9 0.6 6.1 9.3 .. .. ..
All above SSA Countries 0.8 0.9 1.1 1.4 1.4 1.5 -5.6 -5.3 -9.0
Source: Based on partner data from UN COMTRADE Statistics (trade data) and World Bank WDI database (GDP data).
Table 1. Exports and Imports of Raw Food and All Agricultural Products and Their Shares in GDP by SSA Countries7  POVERTY REDUCTION AND ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT (PREM) NETWORK     www.worldbank.org/economicpremise
struggled to find corn, rice, and wheat to deliver to markets. In 
the summer of 2008, No Street was struggling to manage the 
food crisis and the macroeconomic instability that it caused, 
while policy debates in the West focused on the causes of the 
mortgage crisis and its resolution.  
In September 2008, Wall Street met No Street: Lehman 
Brothers collapsed, and the once separate food crisis in Africa 
and mortgage crisis in the United States transformed into a 
global financial crisis. 
With the U.S. housing crisis underway, the food crisis ongo-
ing in developing countries and rising fuel prices straining 
world economies, the three basic elements necessary for a cri-
sis—vulnerability, globalization, and illiquidity—were fully 
aligned.
Dealing with Financial Crisis in a Globalized 
Age: Innovation, Markets, and Regulation
As the crisis unfolded, policy analysts classified its impact in 
waves (World Bank 2009b): the meltdown of Wall Street and 
other financial markets; the collapse of the banking and finan-
cial sectors; and the freezing of the real sector. Policy analysts 
concluded that only the third wave would impact LICs, and 
SSA in particular. As a result, much of the debates about the 
solutions needed to tackle the food price crisis remain di-
vorced from the debate around the financial crisis and its solu-
tions. A lack of understanding of the intimate link between 
the two events continues to undermine policy proposals for 
LICs as they emerge from these crises. 
In September 2008, in response to calls for action, the G-20 
leaders met at the Washington, DC, Summit on Financial Mar-
kets and the World Economy and launched a broad dialogue 
on financial regulation and reform. In 2009, in London, the 
G-20 leaders created the Financial Stability Board, which was 
tasked with addressing vulnerabilities and developing and im-
plementing strong regulatory, supervisory and other policies 
in the interest of financial stability.18 Specifically, the FSB was 
asked among other things to: (i) assess vulnerabilities affecting 
the global financial system and identify and review, on a timely 
and ongoing basis, the regulatory, supervisory, and related ac-
tions needed to address them and their outcomes; (ii) promote 
coordination and information exchange among authorities re-
sponsible for financial stability; and (iii) monitor and advise on 
market developments and their implications for regulatory 
policy. 
The crisis exposed fundamental weaknesses in the structure 
of the OTC derivatives markets that contributed to the build-
up of systemic risk across continents, markets, and financial 
instruments. The trading of OTC derivatives and other finan-
cial instruments had linked No Street corn, soy, and wheat 
farmers and consumers with first-rate markets, such as the Chi-
cago Board of Trade and other renowned financial houses, in an 
unprecedented way. 
At the Pittsburg G-20 Summit, the FSB was asked to investi-
gate possible weaknesses in the infrastructure of OTC deriva-
tives. In June 2010, the G-20 leaders met in Toronto and agreed 
that by the end of 2012, all OTC derivative contracts should be 
traded on exchanges or electronic trading platforms (where ap-
propriate) and cleared through central counterparties (CCPs), 
and that OTC derivatives contracts should be reported to trade 
repositories.19 The G-20 leaders’ commitments concerning 
standardization, central clearing, exchange or electronic plat-
form trading, and reporting of OTC derivatives transactions to 
trade repositories are important steps in improving the trans-
parency of the commodity trading system. They must be linked 
to markets in the developing economies.
On the agriculture front in Africa, the response to the food 
crisis has been to tackle costs, production, and productivity is-
sues as well as put in place safety net systems and secure stocks 
for humanitarian assistance to support the most vulnerable 
people. Countries, as part of their response, are also trying to 
improve commodity trading systems and infrastructure by 
supporting the development of warehouse receipts systems 
and national commodity exchanges. Some countries, for ex-
ample, Ethiopia, have developed commodity exchanges, while 
other countries, like Tanzania, Ghana, Uganda, Zambia, Kenya 
and Malawi, either have nascent commodity exchange plat-
forms or are looking to create them. Commodity exchanges 
would help farmers improve their links to global markets, 
hedge price risks, and have access to better market information. 
They would also help countries develop and deepen their do-
mestic financial sectors. These exchanges must now comply 
with FSB requirements. In the United States, the Dodd-Frank 
Law, the most comprehensive financial regulation in 30 years, 
outlines a framework that should be analyzed and understood 
by developing countries that plan to develop commodity trad-
ing platforms to ensure that the lessons from the 2008 finan-
cial crisis are learned and not repeated.  
In parallel to the debate on the causes and implications of 
the financial crisis, many financial institutions are developing 
new financial instruments to help developing country govern-
ments and farmers manage the next crisis. Africa would con-
tinue to need new and innovative financial instruments to sup-
port its growth. Any new financial regulations must take these 
innovations into account. 
The increase in innovative financial instruments in LICs has 
a number of implications for the current response to the finan-
cial crisis. First, this means that the new emerging financial ar-
chitecture must be inclusive of developing countries needs and 
must be transparent. Second, FSB recommendations should be 
discussed at a broader level and consultations should extend 
beyond G-20 countries. Third, the regulatory framework and 
agency monitoring system of the FSB should extend to offshore 
activities in LICs. Fourth, the new Agriculture Market Infor-
mation System (AMIS) should be linked to and monitored by 8  POVERTY REDUCTION AND ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT (PREM) NETWORK     www.worldbank.org/economicpremise
the FSB as part of the financial market surveillance system if it 
is to be effective. In addition, market information available 
must be relevant for smallholder farmers across the developing 
world. Fifth, the capacity of national regulatory agencies in 
LICs should also be assessed and provisions made to strengthen 
them. In the presence of globalized markets, financial product 
regulation should be comprehensive and integrated so that in-
terdependencies are transparent. In this case, one key role of the 
FSB would be to highlight emerging gaps in the system and to 
propose remedies, taking into consideration how they relate to 
LICs. Finally, regulators must acknowledge the truly global na-
ture of financial markets and instruments. No country should 
be too small to fail. 
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Notes
1. Between 2008 and 2009, prices remained high. For exam-
ple, the average price of rice in 2009 was 90 percent higher 
than the average price in 2006 (FAO 2009d).
2. “No Street” is a term used to refer to poor and largely rural 
areas in LICs.
3. World Bank Group, 2010 World Economic Indicators. 
4. A home loan, where the interest rate and the resulting 
monthly payment is tied to a short-term rate, like the one-year 
Treasury Bill rate. Typically, the mortgage interest rate will be 
two or three percentage points above the related short-term 
rate. In addition, the interest rate at time of purchase could be 
adjusted annually or based on payment history. 
5. OTC derivatives are privately negotiated financial contracts 
whose market value is determined by the value of an underly-
ing asset, reference rate, or index. 
6. With exchange-traded derivatives, credit risk is borne by clear-
inghouses that serve as intermediaries between the parties to all 
transactions by becoming the buyer to every seller and the seller 
to every buyer. Clearinghouses guarantee the performance of 
exchange-traded contracts so that parties to these transactions 
do not have to evaluate the creditworthiness of each other.
7. http//Mbaa.org. 
8. World Bank Group, 2009 World Economic Indicators.
9. Commodity Price Index, IMF data and statistics (2010), and 
author’s calculations.
10. U.S. Department of the Treasury, http://www.treasury.gov/
resource-center/data-chart-center/interest-rates.
11. http://www.bea.gov/scb/pdf/2007/.
12. See http://www.investorsinsight.com/.../additional-though 
ts-on-the-continuing-crisis.aspx.
13. CFTC Commodity Index Trader Supplement Statistics 
(2010).  
14. BIS (2011) and author’s calculation. 
15. UN Comtrade statistics; author’s calculations; and World 
Integrated Trade Solutions (WITS), World Bank. 
16. World Development Indicators (2009) and UN Comtrade 
data (2009). 
17. Author’s calculations, with data from United Nations 




19. See June 2010, Toronto Summit Declaration, paragraph 
19. In addition, annex II to the Declaration provides: “We
pledged to work in a coordinated manner to accelerate the im-
plementation of over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives
regulation and supervision and to increase transparency and 
standardization. We reaffirm our commitment to trade all
standardized OTC derivatives contracts on exchanges or elec-
tronic trading platforms, where appropriate, and clear
through central counterparties (CCPs) by end-2012 at the lat-
est. OTC derivative contracts should be reported to trade
repositories (TRs). We will work toward the establishment of 
CCPs and TRs in line with global standards and ensure
that national regulators and supervisors have access to all rele-
vant information.”
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